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Legal Ethics

by Patrick Emery Longan
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey covers a two-year period from June 1, 2013 to May 31,
2015.1 The Article discusses noteworthy Georgia appellate cases
concerning attorney discipline, disqualification, ineffective assistance of
counsel, judicial ethics, and legal malpractice. The Article also discusses
two significant opinions from the Formal Advisory Opinion Board,
amendments to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, and several
recent miscellaneous cases involving legal ethics in Georgia.
II.
A.

LAWYER DISCIPLINE

Disbarments'

Trust Account Abuse or Other Financial Transgres1.
sions. The Georgia Supreme Court demonstrated again during this
survey period that it has little tolerance for violations of the trust
account rules or for other financial transgressions. The court disbarred
fifteen lawyers in which such conduct was the sole or primary focus of
the lawyer's disciplinary proceedings.
* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (B.A., 1979);
University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars
of Georgia and Texas.
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics during the June 1, 2012 to May 31, 2013
survey period, see Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65
MERCER L. REV. 175 (2013).
2. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition for
voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-110(f) (2015). The acceptance
of a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting of a petition for voluntary discipline
of disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the court and are treated as such in this
Article. Id.
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Several lawyers chose to bypass their trust accounts. Robert T.
Thompson, Jr. handled an action for a client to try to stop foreclosure of
the client's home. While the action was pending and there was an
injunction to prevent the foreclosure, Thompson required the client to
make monthly payments that eventually totaled $15,000 to show "good
faith" (presumably to the lender). However, Thompson did not keep
those funds in his trust account and claimed, falsely, that they were for
legal services.' The court disbarred Thompson.' Joseph Kizito was
disbarred because he accepted over $4000 from a client for attorney and
filing fees in an immigration matter, but he never filed the case and did
not keep the filing fees in his attorney trust account." Henry Lamar
Willis was disbarred because he deposited a client's $30,000 settlement
check into a personal or business account (he did not maintain an
attorney trust account), and Willis converted the funds to his own use.'
Three lawyers lost their licenses because they took client money for
themselves. The court disbarred Donald L. Jones because he settled four
personal injury cases and then absconded with the money.' Rodd
Walton received thousands of dollars from a client. He was supposed to
use most of the money to resolve claims against the client and to retain
an attorney for the client in another state. Instead, Walton converted
the funds to his own use and abandoned his law practice.' He also
ceased communicating with a client in a personal injury case, and, as a
result of all of these actions, the court disbarred Walton.? Ted Webster
Wooten III lost his license because he kept the funds after he settled a
client's personal injury case for $100,000.o Although Wooten initially
placed those funds in his trust account, he eventually used all of those
funds for his personal use.n
The court disbarred several lawyers for overdrawing their trust
accounts, commingling personal and client funds, failing to keep
adequate records, or using their attorney trust account to pay personal
bills. Tracey Dawn Gibson lost her license because she overdrew her
trust account, paid numerous personal expenses from the trust account,
practiced law while she was suspended, and abandoned two clients.1 2

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

In re Thompson, 296 Ga. 491, 491-92, 769 S.E.2d 92, 93 (2015).
Id. at 492, 769 S.E.2d at 93.
In re Kizito, 296 Ga. 355, 355, 765 S.E.2d 363, 363-64 (2014).
In re Willis, 293 Ga. 781, 781, 749 S.E.2d 740, 740 (2013).
In re Jones, 296 Ga. 151, 151, 765 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2014).
In re Walton, 296 Ga. 631, 631-32, 769 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (2015).
Id. at 652, 769 S.E.2d at 362-63, 363.
In re Wooten, 295 Ga. 856, 857, 764 S.E.2d 551, 551 (2014).
Id. at 857, 764 S.E.2d at 551.
In re Gibson, 297 Ga. 44, 44-45, 771 S.E.2d 900, 900, 901 (2015).
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The court disbarred Sharla Monique Gorman because she settled a
personal injury case for a client but commingled the client's funds with
her personal funds and used the client's funds to pay personal expenses." The court accepted the petition for the voluntary surrender of
Robert W. Cullen's license because he admittedly failed to account for
fiduciary funds and failed to keep the funds separate from his own
property.' 4 Cullen admitted that he had physical and psychological
issues that incapacitated him from continuing to practice law." Robert
B. Lipman represented a client in a personal injury case, signed the
names of his client and his client's wife to a release of the claims, and
had one of his employees notarize those signatures. Lipman did not
account for the client's funds, failed to deliver the client's funds, and,
shortly after he received and deposited the settlement check, Lipman
issued a check from his trust account to pay an unrelated expense. 6
Lipman voluntarily surrendered his license." Hendrickx H. Toussaint
also voluntarily surrendered his license because he accepted funds as an
escrow agent but then conducted numerous transactions involving those
funds without keeping records of where the money came from or where
it went.' 8
Several lawyers were disbarred because, at least in part, of actions
they took in connection with trusts or estates. The court disbarred
Robert Gist after he failed to account for funds in a trust he administered for a deceased former client; he then wrote checks on behalf of the
trust from an account that was not his attorney trust account." Gist
also defrauded more than thirty clients out of several million dollars by
soliciting the clients to invest in securities. Instead of investing the
money, he funneled the money to a company he controlled and for which
he fabricated account statements that he sent to the clients."0 Barbara
W. Willis was disbarred because, as the administrator of two estates, she
converted over $36,000 of estate funds to her own use and submitted
false accountings with the probate court.2
Other lawyers' financial transgressions were accompanied by other
violations of the rules of conduct. The court accepted Richard Wesley
Kelley's petition for voluntary surrender of his license after he failed to

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

In re Gorman, 294 Ga. 726, 726, 727, 755 S.E.2d 746, 746, 747 (2014).
In re Cullen, 293 Ga. 782, 782, 783, 749 S.E.2d 741, 741 (2013).
Id. at 782, 749 S.E.2d at 741.
In re Lipman, 293 Ga. 580, 580, 580-81, 748 S.E.2d 454, 455 (2013).
Id. at 581, 748 S.E.2d at 455.
In re Toussaint, 294 Ga. 439, 439, 753 S.E.2d 118, 118 (2014).
In re Gist, 297 Ga. 142, 143, 144, 772 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2015).
Id. at 144, 772 S.E.2d at 706.
In re Willis, 295 Ga. 454, 455, 761 S.E.2d 81, 81 (2014).
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account for client funds in three separate matters and abandoned
another client's defense in a criminal case. 22 The court noted that
Kelley had been arrested for crimes relating to previous mishandling of
client funds, and it rejected his arguments that depression and
substance abuse warranted an indefinite suspension rather than the
surrender of his license.23 The court also disbarred Carin Astrid
Burgess as a result of numerous violations of the rules of conduct,
despite a recommendation for suspension from the review panel.2 4 In
one matter, Burgess disbursed settlement funds to a client in infrequent
and random amounts, while in another case, she disbursed funds from
her trust account to herself and her client in defiance of a court order to
deposit those funds in the court's registry. In three other cases, Burgess
did not comply with her duties of communication and diligence in
representing clients, and for a time, Burgess practiced law while she was
suspended for failure to pay her bar dues.25
2. Client Abandonment. Abandonment of clients was, as usual,
another significant cause of disbarments during this survey period.
Eight lawyers lost their licenses in cases in which abandonment was at
the heart of the lawyer's conduct. The court disbarred Douglas Grant
Exley after he abandoned two clients and failed to return the fees that
the clients already paid him. 26 Robert Anthony McDonald failed to
respond to four notices of discipline that made similar allegations: he
had undertaken to represent clients, ceased communicating with them,
and failed to respond to numerous efforts by the clients to reach him.
In one case, McDonald also failed to account for part of a client's
Michael Rene' Berlon
settlement."
The court disbarred him.28
accepted a medical malpractice case but never filed the case and for
almost two years failed to accurately advise the client about the status
of the matter.29 Berlon compounded his problem by making misrepresentations to the State Bar of Georgia in his response to the grievance,
and the court accepted his petition for voluntary surrender.o Sarah
Spence Cooksey was disbarred because, after she undertook to represent
a client, she eventually ceased communicating with the client, vacated

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

In re Kelley, 294 Ga. 612, 613, 614, 755 S.E.2d 197, 197-98, 198, 199 (2014).
Id. at 614, 755 S.E.2d at 198-99.
In re Burgess, 293 Ga. 783, 785, 748 S.E.2d 916, 918 (2013).
Id. at 784, 784-85, 748 S.E.2d at 917, 917-18, 918.
In re Exley, 296 Ga. 630, 630, 631, 769 S.E.2d 390, 391 (2015).
In re McDonald, 295 Ga. 849, 850, 852, 764 S.E.2d 802, 802, 803 (2014).
Id. at 852, 764 S.E.2d at 804.
In re Berlon, 295 Ga. 361, 361, 759 S.E.2d 866, 867 (2014).
Id. at 361-62, 759 S.E.2d at 867.
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her office, stopped attending hearings in the case, and falsely informed
the court that the client had not retained her." Eric Jerome Carter
voluntarily surrendered his license because in two cases he neglected his
clients' appeals from their criminal convictions, and in another case he
failed to provide his clients with full disclosure about medical liens
related to settlement proceeds that he held in his trust account.3 2 The
court disbarred Leah Rochelle Brown because she accepted fees to
represent four divorce clients but abandoned all four clients.
Michael
David Mann lost his license because he repeatedly failed to appear for
hearings for three clients in criminal matters and made a false
statement to the court that he actually had appeared on a certain
day.3 4 The supreme court disbarred Ralph Joseph Hiers because he
accepted payment to represent a client in a divorce case but, after one
exchange about a counterclaim, ceased communicating with the client
and failed to refund any of the fees that the client already paid."
3. Criminal Activity. During the survey period, lawyers also lost
their licenses as a result of felony convictions or other criminal activity.
Twelve disbarments were in this category. A number of these disbarment
cases involved drug charges. Rand J. Csehy pled nolo contendere to two
felony counts of drug possession and one felony count of possessing a gun
during the commission of a crime, and he was sentenced as a first
offender.3'6 The court disbarred Csehy after he compounded his problem
by appearing in court under the influence of illegal drugs while his
petition for voluntary discipline was pending.' Lauren Gordon Garner
voluntarily surrendered her license after she pled guilty to felony
possession of a controlled substance and possession of a drug-related
object." Ashley A. Davis also voluntarily surrendered her license after
she pled guilty to two felonies, possession of methamphetamine and
making a false statement." The supreme court accepted the voluntary
surrender of Arjun S. Kapoor's license because he pled guilty, as a first
offender, to one count of the sale of methamphetamine."

31. In re Cooksey, 295 Ga. 135, 135, 757 S.E.2d 868, 868-69 (2014).
32. In re Carter, 294 Ga. 723, 723-24, 755 S.E.2d 743, 744 (2014).
33. In re Brown, 294 Ga. 722, 722, 755 S.E.2d 742, 743 (2014).
34. In re Mann, 293 Ga. 664, 664, 665, 748 S.E.2d 914, 915, 916 (2013).
35. In re Hiers, 293 Ga. 663, 663, 664, 748 S.E.2d 923, 923-25, 925 (2013).
36. In re Csehy, 296 Ga. 492, 492, 769 S.E.2d 93, 93 (2015).
37. Id. at 492-93, 769 S.E.2d at 93.
38. In re Garner, 295 Ga. 856, 856, 764 S.E.2d 550, 550-51 (2014).
39. In re Davis, 295 Ga. 848, 848, 764 S.E.2d 548, 548, 549 (2014).
40. In re Kapoor, 294 Ga. 782, 782, 783, 755 S.E.2d 805, 805 (2014).
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Other cases involved fraud, forgery, robbery, theft, or other financial
crimes. Michael Louis Rothenberg voluntarily surrendered his license
after he pled guilty to wire fraud in federal court." Ronald Pak
voluntarily surrendered his license after he was indicted on a charge of
criminal attempt to commit armed robbery.42 Pak admitted to suffering
from mental illness, in particular bipolar disorder, which sufficiently
impaired his competence as an attorney. 43 In 2010, Gregory Bartko
was convicted of conspiracy, mail fraud, and the sale of unregistered
securities." The Georgia Supreme Court accepted Bartko's surrender
of his law license after the United States Supreme Court declined his
petition for a writ of certiorari.4 5 The court accepted Kristen E.
Richbourg's petition for voluntary surrender after she pled guilty to
felony counts of forgery and theft by taking by a fiduciary.
Thomas
Stanley Sunderland surrendered his license after he pled guilty to
stealing over $188,000 from a minor's conservatorship estate.4 7 The
court accepted his petition and noted that disbarment was appropriate
both because the underlying act was itself a violation of Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.15(1)48 and (II)49 and also because of the
felony conviction.o
Three of these cases do not fall easily into any category. The court
disbarred Sidney Joe Jones because he smuggled tobacco and tobaccorelated items to a client in the Richmond County Jail and lied about it
when he was caught." Jones pled guilty to eleven misdemeanors, ten
of which involved smuggling the contraband.5 2 The supreme court held
that these convictions were for acts involving "moral turpitude" (and,
therefore, constituted misconduct under Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.4(a)(3)") because they involved deceit, were in breach of
Jones's trust as an attorney, and threatened the security of the jail.54
Although the special master recommended an eighteen-month suspen-

41. In re Rothenberg, 294 Ga. 211, 211, 212, 751 S.E.2d 417, 417, 418 (2013).
42. In re Pak, 295 Ga. 458, 458, 761 S.E.2d 82, 82 (2014).
43. Id. at 458, 761 S.E.2d at 82.
44. In re Bartko, 295 Ga. 862, 862-63, 764 S.E.2d 553, 553 (2014).
45. Id. at 863, 764 S.E.2d at 553.
46. In re Richbourg, 294 Ga. 440, 440, 754 S.E.2d 80, 80 (2014).
47. In re Sunderland, 294 Ga. 210, 210-11, 751 S.E.2d 417, 417 (2013).
48.
49.

See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(I) (2015).
See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(11) (2015).

50.
51.
52.

Sunderland, 294 Ga at 211, 751 S.E.2d at 417.
In re Jones, 293 Ga. 264, 265, 744 S.E.2d 6, 7 (2013).
Id. at 264, 744 S.E.2d at 7.

53.

See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3) (2015).

54.

Jones, 293 Ga. at 266-67, 744 S.E.2d at 8-9.
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sion, the supreme court unanimously disbarred Jones." Joseph Citron
attempted to bolster his credibility as a testifying expert and instead
ended up pleading nolo contendere to nine felony counts of perjury, eight
misdemeanor counts of perjury, and one misdemeanor count for an
unsworn falsification." The court accepted the voluntary surrender of
Citron's license." The court disbarred William V. Hall, Jr. after he was
convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery and misdemeanor public
indecency, arising from an incident in which he exposed himself to a
client, touched her, and offered to reduce her legal fee in exchange for
oral sex."
4. Miscellaneous Disbarments. Trust account issues, abandonment, and criminal activity are the three most common causes of
disbarment in Georgia. Eight lawyers lost their licenses for other
miscellaneous reasons during the survey period. Xavier Cornell Dicks
waited too long to file an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, and he did
not inform his client when the case was dismissed. Dicks also had his
client sign a release of any civil claim in exchange for a promise that
Dicks would pay the client $25,000. However, Dicks did not inform the
client of the desirability of having another attorney advise the client
about that transaction. 9 Dicks claimed that he suffered from a mental
impairment but never presented any admissible evidence to that effect,
and therefore, the court disbarred Dicks."
The court disbarred James F. Steckbauer because he failed to act
diligently and communicate with clients in two matters in which
Steckbauer allowed a disbarred attorney to meet with the clients, who
believed that the disbarred attorney was a licensed lawyer." Steckbauer also accepted fees and expenses from a collection agency client in
return for services that he never rendered.62

55. Id. at 267, 744 S.E.2d at 9.
56. In re Citron, 296 Ga. 692, 692, 769 S.E.2d 927, 927 (2015).
57. Id. at 692, 769 S.E.2d at 927.
58. In re Hall, Jr., 295 Ga. 452, 452, 453, 761 S.E.2d 51, 52, 53 (2014).
59. In re Dicks, 295 Ga. 181, 181-82, 758 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2014); see also GA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2015) ("A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the
client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such
liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person
in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.").
60. Dicks, 295 Ga. at 183, 758 S.E.2d at 313.
61. In re Steckbauer, 293 Ga. 893, 894, 895, 750 S.E.2d 363, 364-65, 366 (2013).
62. Id. at 895, 750 S.E.2d at 365.
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The court disbarred Stephen L. Minsk after he forged the name of the
individual principal of his client on a bankruptcy petition and on the
related statement of financial affairs, both of which he filed with the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia.13
The supreme court noted that Minsk was sanctioned by the bankruptcy
court for knowingly making false statements to the court, the client, and
third parties and that the bankruptcy court held him in contempt when
he failed to comply with an agreed-upon plan to pay the sanctions in
installments.6 4
Clark Jones-Lewis was under suspension when she contacted the
chambers of a juvenile court judge and claimed to be an attorney
representing grandparents who wanted to adopt a child in the custody
of the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services."
The supreme court disbarred her for practicing without a license and for
making false statements to the juvenile court.6 6
In a 4-2 decision, the supreme court disbarred Denise L. Majette, a
former state court judge and member of Congress." The special master
found that Majette submitted "wholly unsupported and materially
misleading time sheets and invoices" to a client, misrepresented her
hours and fees in submissions to a court, and, in the disciplinary process,
misrepresented payments she had received.6 8 The Review Panel made
additional findings that Majette improperly charged a client for her time
attending a CLE program that was unrelated to the representation.6 9
Although the Review Panel recommended a three-year suspension
"because this was [her] only disciplinary proceeding 'in an otherwise
distinguished career,"' the court disbarred her.70 Justice Melton and
Chief Justice Thompson dissented because a suspension was more
appropriate given Majette's "over thirty years of distinguished service to
7
the bench and bar with no disciplinary problems whatsoever."
Donald 0. Nelson closed a real estate transaction in which a husband
and wife were joint borrowers. One month later, Nelson's office prepared
a quitclaim deed from the husband to the wife. Somebody other than the

63. In re Minsk, 296 Ga. 152, 152-53, 765 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2014).
64. Id. at 153, 765 S.E.2d at 362.
65. In re Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861, 861-62, 764 S.E.2d 549, 549 (2014).
66. Id. at 862, 764 S.E.2d at 549.
67. FormerCongresswomanDisbarredby State Supreme Court, THE BROOKHAVEN POST
(Mar. 28, 2014), www.brookhavenpost.co/former-congresswoman-disbarred-by-state6
supreme-court/1481 ; see also In re Majette, 295 Ga. 4, 757 S.E.2d 114 (2014).
68. Majette, 295 Ga. at 7, 757 S.E.2d at 116.
69. Id. at 7-8, 757 S.E.2d at 116-17.
70. Id. at 8, 9, 757 S.E.2d at 117.
71. Id. at 9, 757 S.E.2d at 118 (Melton, J., dissenting).
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husband signed that deed, but Nelson witnessed the signature and had
his assistant notarize it. After a grievance was filed, Nelson made
repeated misrepresentations of fact to the State Bar about the execution
of the quitclaim deed.7 2 The supreme court disbarred him."
The court disbarred William C. Nesbitt because he established a law
firm with clients who were not lawyers and engaged in numerous
deceitful acts in connection with real property in Florida." One of the
non-lawyer clients was the firm's chief financial officer, and both the
chief financial officer and Nesbitt were involved in the day-to-day
business operation of the firm. Regarding the Florida property, Nesbitt
obtained its transfer from his senile mother to his domestic partner in
a sham transaction to avoid taxes and probate, misrepresented his
marital status to a lender, failed to disclose tax liens to a lender, failed
to use loan proceeds appropriately, and executed a mortgage on the
property at a time when he owned no interest in it."
In a 4-3 decision, the supreme court disbarred Edward T. Murray in
the wake of four grievances and three prior instances of confidential
discipline.76 The special master found that Murray operated a high
volume divorce and criminal defense practice in which he was heavily
dependent on clerical help to keep his clients informed." "In each of
[the] four cases, Murray failed to properly communicate with his clients,
and he failed to properly supervise his staff and monitor his cases.""
The special master recommended an eighteen-month suspension, but the
court disbarred Murray." Justice Benham filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Thompson and Justice Melton joined, arguing
that disbarment was "needlessly harsh" because Murray's errors were
the result of "being personally and professionally overextended for a
period of time."" Murray had acquired a new practice at the same
time his wife, who was also his main paralegal, was seriously ill.8 1
5. Reciprocal Disbarments. The supreme court generally gives
Georgia lawyers who are disciplined in other states the same discipline
in Georgia as a matter of reciprocity. During the survey period, three

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

In re Nelson, 293 Ga. 578, 578, 748 S.E.2d 452, 453 (2013).
Id. at 579, 748 S.E.2d at 453.
In re Nesbitt, 294 Ga. 480, 480, 482, 754 S.E.2d 363, 364, 365 (2014).
Id. at 480-81, 481, 754 S.E.2d at 364, 365.
In re Murray, 295 Ga. 71, 72, 75, 757 S.E.2d 134, 134-35, 135, 137 (2014).
Id. at 72, 757 S.E.2d at 135.
Id.
Id. at 73, 75, 757 S.E.2d at 136, 137.
Id. at 75-76, 757 S.E.2d at 137 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Henry T. Swann III was
lawyers were disbarred in such cases.
disbarred in Georgia because the Supreme Court of Florida disbarred
him for numerous violations of the Florida rules of conduct over a
several year period." Michael B. Shankle voluntarily surrendered his
license because he had been disbarred in North Carolina for misappropriating client funds in 1997.3 Creighton W. Sossomon lost his North
Carolina license for using entrusted funds for the benefit of third parties
without the beneficial owners' permission to use the funds, and as a
result he lost his Georgia license as well. 84
B.

Suspensions85

During the survey period, eight Georgia lawyers received suspensions
of six months or less. Four of these were suspensions as reciprocal
discipline for infractions that included misrepresentations to a court,
failure to supervise a high-volume foreclosure practice," abandonment,
failure to communicate, and overbilling," and retention of referral fees
that should have been paid to the lawyer's firm." A six-month
suspension resulted from the lawyer's "technical" violation of Rule 1.15(I)
and Rule 1.15(XII) by allowing his paralegal to deliver cash that had
come from a settlement funding company to clients without depositing
the funds into the lawyer's trust account or maintaining records of the
money.90 A trust account violation was also part of another case, in
which the lawyer was suspended for six months because he failed to
notify a client of the receipt of funds that belonged to the client and
failed to place them in the trust account." The lawyer also allowed a
disbarred lawyer to have client contact and disregarded the instructions
of another client regarding a complaint.92 A lawyer received a six-

82. In re Swann, 296 Ga. 154, 154, 765 S.E.2d 363, 363 (2014).
83. In re Shankle, 295 Ga. 853, 853, 764 S.E.2d 549, 549 (2014).
84. In re Sossomon, 293 Ga. 669, 669-70, 670, 748 S.E.2d 925, 925 (2013).
85. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
86. In re Kurpiers, 293 Ga. 778, 778, 779, 749 S.E.2d 738, 738 (2013) (ninety-one day
suspension).
87. In re Watson, 294 Ga. 616, 616, 618, 755 S.E.2d 199, 199-200, 200 (2014) (ninetyone day suspension).
88. In re Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727, 729, 730, 755 S.E.2d 758, 759, 760 (2014) (six month
suspension followed by a twenty-four day suspension).
89. In re Bounds, 294 Ga. 724, 725, 755 S.E.2d 745, 745, 746 (2014) (thirty-day
suspension).
90. In re Ibrahim, 295 Ga. 753, 753, 754, 763 S.E.2d 877, 877-78, 878 (2014).
91. In re Calomeni, 293 Ga. 673, 673, 748 S.E.2d 926, 926 (2013).
92. Id. at 673, 748 S.E.2d at 926. For the description of the underlying offenses, see
the court's earlier opinion in which it rejected a petition for voluntary discipline. In re
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month suspension as a result of two grievances-one alleged that the
lawyer neglected to inform the client that the lawyer would not be filing
suit for the client and the other alleged that the lawyer settled a case
without client authorization." Finally, a lawyer was suspended for six
months because he allowed a disbarred lawyer to contact and advise
clients and told the clients that the disbarred lawyer was an attorney.9 4
Five lawyers received one year suspensions. One of these was an
extension of an existing two-year suspension because, while the lawyer's
earlier matter was pending, the lawyer failed to tell a client that a court
had granted summary judgment against the client." The lawyer
admitted that he suffered from bipolar disorder and depression and
informed the supreme court that he had successfully completed
treatment; the court made reinstatement conditional upon a finding by
a licensed psychologist that the lawyer is mentally competent to
practice.96 A lawyer was suspended for a year because he failed to
report to the bar that he had been convicted of wire fraud in federal
court in 2007." Although he had successfully completed his probation
and there were numerous mitigating factors with respect to the
underlying offense, the court concluded that the failure to report the
conviction warranted a one-year suspension." Another lawyer received
a one-year suspension because he abandoned three clients at a time
when he was addicted to alcohol."
Another attorney deposited the settlement funds from a personal
injury case for several family members into her trust account but did not
notify her clients. The lawyer then undertook another matter for two of
the family members on an hourly basis. Without authorization from all
the family members, and at a time when she knew or should have
known that at least two family members disputed her right to do so, the
lawyer used the settlement funds from the first case to satisfy her bills
in the second one."9 o The court suspended her license for a year.'

Calomeni, 293 Ga. 76, 77, 743 S.E.2d 424, 426 (2013).
93. In re Copeland, 297 Ga. 144, 145, 146, 772 S.E.2d 634, 635, 635-36 (2015).
94. In re Tucker, 295 Ga. 357, 357-58, 759 S.E.2d 854, 855 (2014). Note that Justice
Nahmias wrote a lengthy concurrence to emphasize that the court will not treat, as a
mitigating factor, the sanctions of another court with respect to the same conduct (the
bankruptcy court had suspended Tucker from practicing in that court for six months for
this same conduct). Id. at 359, 759 S.E.2d at 856 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
95. In re Lang, 295 Ga. 220, 220, 222, 759 S.E.2d 47, 47-48, 49 (2014).
96. Id. at 220-21, 759 S.E.2d at 48.
97. In re Vincent, 295 Ga. 766, 766, 768, 764 S.E.2d 133, 133, 135 (2014).
98. Id. at 768, 764 S.E.2d at 134-35.
99. In re Anderson, 294 Ga. 615, 615, 616, 755 S.E.2d 204, 204 (2014).
100. In re Wright, 294 Ga. 289, 289-90, 290, 291, 751 S.E.2d 817, 818, 818-19 (2013).
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Finally, a lawyer was suspended for one year as reciprocal discipline
after she abandoned three clients in Pennsylvania and engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in New Jersey.102
The court suspended eight lawyers for periods of more than one year.
Three of these cases primarily involved lack of diligence. One lawyer
was suspended for three years because he abandoned two clients in
criminal matters and refunded only a small percentage of the fees he
had collected.o0 Another received a thirty-month suspension because,
during a time when he was suffering personal and emotional problems,
he did not act with diligence, communicate in a timely manner, or
terminate the representation properly with respect to three clients."o4
The lawyer did, however, make full restitution to the clients.'0 " A
third lawyer was suspended for eighteen months in part because he
arrived unprepared to defend one client in a criminal case. For another
criminal client, the lawyer failed to file an amended motion for new trial
and, for a period of ten years, did not succeed in obtaining transcripts for
an appeal. 0 6
Four lawyers received lengthy suspensions for a variety of reasons.
One was suspended for eighteen months because he had a consensual
sexual relationship with a divorce client and helped the client submit
false responses in discovery about their relationship. 07 Another
lawyer lost his right to practice for the eighteen months it would take for
him to complete the Cobb County Drug Treatment Court program after
the lawyer pled guilty to possession of more than an ounce of marijuana,
The
which he had been growing in his home for personal use.'
Supreme Court of New York suspended a lawyer who also had a Georgia
license for testifying falsely in the New York disciplinary process about
a fee dispute with another lawyer. The Georgia Supreme Court
suspended the lawyer for thirty months as a matter of reciprocity.'0 o
Another lawyer received an eighteen-month suspension in connection

101. Id. at 294, 751 S.E.2d at 821.
102. In re Chandler, 293 Ga. 777, 777, 749 S.E.2d 737, 737 (2013).
103. In re Lea, 296 Ga. 79, 79-80, 80, 764 S.E.2d 859, 859, 859-60 (2014). Justice
Benham dissented and would have imposed only a two-year suspension. Id. at 80, 764
S.E.2d at 860 (Benham, J., dissenting).
104. In re Polk, 295 Ga. 215, 215-16, 216, 758 S.E.2d 830, 831 (2014).
105. Id. at 216, 758 S.E.2d at 831.
106. In re Adams, 293 Ga. 899, 899-900, 900, 750 S.E.2d 369, 369-70, 370 (2013).
107. In re MacKenna, 294 Ga. 72, 72, 73, 751 S.E.2d 98, 98, 99 (2013).
108. In re Topmiller, 293 Ga. 667, 667, 668, 748 S.E.2d 919, 919-20, 920 (2013). The
attorney Topmiller, was later reinstated. In re Topmiller, 295 Ga. 149, 758 S.E.2d 325
(2014).
109. In re Shearer, 293 Ga. 779, 780, 749 S.E.2d 739, 740 (2013).
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with two matters he handled at a time when he was dealing with
alcoholism, depression, and bipolar issues.1 o In one of those matters,
the lawyer failed to remit some settlement funds to a third party, while
in the other, judgment was entered against the client because the lawyer
failed to appear for trial."'
Finally, a lawyer received a three-year suspension over the dissent of
two Georgia Supreme Court Justices who thought the result was too
harsh and despite a recommendation of a three-month suspension from
the Review Panel." 2 The lawyer settled a personal injury case but did
not pay four medical providers and lied to the client and the bar about
the payments."' The supreme court imposed the long suspension and
noted that the lawyer had been disciplined before and that the court was
particularly concerned about the lawyer's dishonesty."'
C.

Public Reprimands

The supreme court ordered public reprimands for five lawyers during
the survey period. In one, the lawyer violated her duties of communication and confidentiality."' The lawyer had failed to communicate with
the client for a period of three months, and when the attorney-client
relationship ended acrimoniously, the client posted negative reviews
about the lawyer on three consumer websites. The lawyer retaliated by
posting a response that revealed confidential information, including the
client's name, the client's employer, how much the client had paid the
lawyer, and that the client had a boyfriend." 6 In another case, the
lawyer received a public reprimand because he accepted a fee to handle
a criminal appeal but did not file an appearance before the appeal was
dismissed and did not refund all of the fee."
Two lawyers received public reprimands for lack of diligence during
periods of time in which they were dealing with serious personal
problems. David P. Hartin received a public reprimand because, while
he was suffering from depression in the aftermath of his divorce, he was
not diligent in filing an uncontested divorce action, in recording a deed,
or securing a court order related to that divorce."1 s

110.
111.
outside
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

In re Greene, 293 Ga. 897, 897-98, 898, 750 S.E.2d 367, 368 (2013).
Id. at 897-98, 750 S.E.2d at 368. The attorney, Greene, was later reinstated
of this survey period. In re Greene, 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 90 (2015).
In re Reddick-Hood, 296 Ga. 95, 97, 98, 764 S.E.2d 416, 418, 419 (2014).
Id. at 95-96, 751 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 97, 764 S.E.2d at 418.
In re Skinner, 295 Ga. 217, 217, 219, 758 S.E.2d 788, 788, 790 (2014).
Id. at 218, 758 S.E.2d at 789.
In re Lloyd, 294 Ga. 604, 604, 755 S.E.2d 203, 204, 205 (2014).
In re Hartin, 295 Ga. 859, 859-60, 861, 764 S.E.2d 542, 542-43, 543 (2014).
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Jerry Wayne Moncus received a public reprimand because he violated
his duty of communication with a client in a civil case."' He admitted
that he should have explained the litigation process better and should
have conveyed the seriousness of responding to discovery requests or a
summary judgment motion. 2 0 Jeffrey L. Sakas received a public
reprimand after he neglected the matters of four clients while he was
under "a disability caused by a combination of factors, including severe
sleep apnea, heart problems, reaction to prescribed medication, and
emotional problems related to a difficult divorce."' 2 1
D.

Review Panel Reprimands

Nine lawyers received Review Panel reprimands during the survey
period. Three of these cases involved a failure to supervise. One lawyer
did not properly supervise an independent contractor who solicited a
potential client.'2 2 Another lawyer was ordered to receive a Review
Panel reprimand because he failed to supervise "sign up" persons whose
job was to meet with patients who were referred by medical providers.12 At least one potential client was allegedly solicited without a
referral.' 24 In the third case, the lawyer's paralegal signed a client's
name to a promissory note to obtain a loan for a medical evaluation,
without the client's permission, because the paralegal was not aware of
an office policy that forbade doing so.' 25
The supreme court approved Review Panel reprimands for four
lawyers who violated their professional responsibilities while they were
experiencing serious personal problems. Daniel J. Saxton was having
health problems when he solicited twelve clients in Rhode Island with
letters that contained misleading information about both the Rhode
Island foreclosure process and the lawyer's connection to Rhode Island.
Saxton also initially provided misleading responses to both the Rhode
Island bar and the Georgia bar.126 A second lawyer suffered from
severe depression and failed to return unearned fees in a timely manner,
but he eventually fully repaid the client.1 27 Maurice Brown had
serious personal and emotional problems because he lost a significant
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124.
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In re Moncus, 296 Ga. 154, 154, 156, 765 S.E.2d 358, 359, 360 (2014).
Id. at 155, 765 S.E.2d at 359.
In re Sakas, 296 Ga. 690, 691, 692, 769 S.E.2d 925, 926, 926-27 (2015).
In re Carter, 293 Ga. 896, 896, 897, 750 S.E.2d 366, 366, 367 (2013).
In re Mashek, 295 Ga. 179, 179-80, 181, 758 S.E.2d 309, 310, 311 (2014).
See id. at 180, 758 S.E.2d at 310.
In re Ellis, 296 Ga. 83, 84, 85, 764 S.E.2d 856, 858 (2014).
In re Saxton, 295 Ga. 754, 754-55, 755, 763 S.E.2d 878, 878-79, 879 (2014).
In re Schatten, 296 Ga. 81, 81, 82, 82-83, 764 S.E.2d 855, 855 (2014).
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portion of his practice when Fulton County changed how it handled
appointments for indigent defense. During that time period, Brown was
appointed to represent a client in a post-conviction matter, but he did
not contact the client for ten months and eventually withdrew without
notifying the client. 1 28 Finally, a fourth lawyer did not communicate
appropriately with four clients (three of whom had to hire new counsel),
and did not fully refund all of their fees, at a time when she had a
combination of physical and emotional problems that led to a multi-day
stay in the hospital.1 2 9
Two other lawyers received Review Panel reprimands. One admitted
that he violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)13 0 because
he loaned a client money in connection with a lawsuit.' 3
Justice
Blackwell concurred and emphasized that a lawyer may be generous and
lend money to clients, as long as the loans are not in connection with
pending or contemplated litigation.1 2 Another lawyer received a
Review Panel reprimand simply because she did not respond to a Notice
of Investigation." 3
III.

DISQUALIFICATION

The Georgia Supreme Court decided a case of first impression in
Hodge v. Urfa-Sexton, LPl34 regarding imputed disqualification.' 3
A law firm that was investigating a claim for a plaintiff employed a
paralegal who was actively involved in that investigation. The paralegal
then changed jobs and went to work for a new firm before a complaint
was filed. Coincidentally, her new firm was investigating the same
matter on behalf of the party that eventually became the defendant.
Once the paralegal learned that the new firm was involved in the
matter, she told her new employer, who promptly screened the paralegal
from any involvement in, or information about, the case. The new firm
did not inform the old firm, however, until two months later-one month
after the old firm had filed the complaint. The old firm moved to
disqualify the new firm. 3 6
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In re Brown, 296 Ga. 439, 439-40, 440, 441, 768 S.E.2d 456, 456-57, 457 (2015).
In re Workman, 296 Ga. 274, 275, 276, 765 S.E.2d 927, 927, 928 (2014).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2015).
In re Morse, 293 Ga. 670, 670, 748 S.E.2d 921, 921 (2013).
Id. at 671, 748 S.E.2d at 922.
In re Goodnight, 295 Ga. 214, 214-15, 215, 758 S.E.2d 830, 830 (2014).
295 Ga. 136, 758 S.E.2d 314 (2014).
Id. at 143, 758 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 137, 137-38, 138, 758 S.E.2d at 317, 317-18, 318.
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These facts forced the court to resolve, for the first time, the circumstances in which hiring a nonlawyer from another firm can create a
conflict of interest that is imputed to the lawyers in the new firm.1 7
The court agreed unanimously on the following points: once the new firm
knows of such a conflict, it must screen the nonlawyer and give prompt
written notice to the old firm.' If the client of the old firm does not
consent to the situation, the client may move to disqualify the new
firm.3 9 The client must show that the nonlawyer worked on the same
matter (or a substantially related one) at the old firm, and if so, the
nonlawyer will be conclusively presumed to possess the client's
confidential information.1 4 0
At that point, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the nonlawyer has disclosed or will disclose the client's
confidential information to the new firm; the new firm may rebut the
presumption, and avoid disqualification, by showing that it took prompt
and effective screening procedures to protect against disclosure of such
information.' 4' The particular screening requirements will vary from
firm to firm but require, at a minimum, that the nonlawyer receive
appropriate instruction and supervision about the need to protect the
confidences of the client of the old firm.1 4 2 The new firm, nevertheless,
will be disqualified if the nonlawyer has already revealed confidences of
the old firm's client, if screening would not be effective, or if the
nonlawyer necessarily would be required to work on the matter that is
the same (or a substantially related one) as that which the nonlawyer
worked on at the old firm. 43
The court decided in Hodge that the new firm instituted appropriate
screening measures.'" However, it remanded for a determination
whether the two-month delay in notifying the old firm should cause the
new firm to be disqualified. 14 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two noteworthy cases that
involved expert witnesses and disqualification. In the first, Wellstar
Health Systems, Inc. v. Kemp,146 the court affirmed the disqualification
of a hospital's attorneys in a medical malpractice case.147 The plain-

137. Id. at 143, 758 S.E.2d at 321.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 144, 758 S.E.2d at 321.
140. Id. at 144, 758 S.E.2d at 321-22.
141. Id. at 144, 758 S.E.2d at 322.
142. Id. at 144-45, 758 S.E.2d at 322.
143. Id. at 145-46, 758 S.E.2d at 322-23.
144. Id. at 147, 758 S.E.2d at 323.
145. Id. at 147-48, 758 S.E.2d at 324.
146. 324 Ga. App. 629, 751 S.E.2d 445 (2013).
147. Id. at 629, 636, 751 S.E.2d at 448, 452.
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tiffs' expert witness was a doctor employed by a different hospital. The
defense lawyers made repeated contacts with the general counsel of that
other hospital, apparently in an attempt to see that pressure would be
applied to the doctor not to testify. The general counsel eventually
contacted the doctor and led the doctor to believe that his employment
was in jeopardy if he testified for the plaintiff. The doctor withdrew as
4
the expert in a "distraught" 4 a.m. telephone call several days later.
The court of appeals explained its affirmance of the trial court's
disqualification order:
[We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
determining that the Lawyers' acts of repeatedly contacting [the
general counsel of the expert's hospital-employer], in order to pressure
[the expert witness] to withdraw from testifying was unethical
behavior; that such behavior was intentionally committed in order to
prevent such testimony; and that after such behavior was questioned
before the trial court, [the lawyers] lacked candor in their testimonies
on the subject.'49
In the other case involving an expert witness, the court of appeals
affirmed the disqualification of the witness.5 o The expert had consulted with counsel for the defendants but was then identified as a witness
for the plaintiffs."' The court of appeals noted that this was a case of
an expert "switching sides," and thus no further analysis was necessary.1

5

2

Two disqualification cases involved questions of appealability.

In

Settendown Public Utility, LLC v. Waterscape Utility, LLC,"' the court

of appeals dismissed cases related to a trial court's disqualification of an
The court held that such orders are interlocutory, and
attorney."18
thus generally not immediately appealable, and that such orders are not
covered by the "collateral order doctrine," which allows some interlocutory orders to be appealed right away.'' In Fein v. Chenault,"' the
court of appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's

148. Id. at 630, 630-31, 751 S.E.2d at 448.
149. Id. at 635-36, 751 S.E.2d at 451.
150. Jai Ganesh Lodging, Inc. v. David M. Smith, Inc., 328 Ga. App. 713, 713, 760
S.E.2d 718, 720 (2014).
151. Id. at 714-15, 760 S.E.2d at 721.
152. Id. at 717-18, 760 S.E.2d at 722-23.
153. 324 Ga. App. 652, 751 S.E.2d 463 (2013).
154. Id. at 652-53, 751 S.E.2d at 465.
155. Id. at 654, 655, 751 S.E.2d at 466, 467.
156. 330 Ga. App. 222, 767 S.E.2d 766 (2014).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

124

[Vol. 67

order that did not disqualify a lawyer but limited his participation in the
case because of alleged misrepresentations to the court.1 5 7
The court of appeals decided two more routine disqualification cases
during the survey period. In one case, the court affirmed the disqualification of a lawyer who represented a client against a former client in a
substantially related matter."' The new representation created an
appearance of impropriety because it concerned the same general subject
matter as the prior representation and grew out of events that occurred
during that representation."' The eleven-month delay in filing the
motion troubled the court, but it nevertheless affirmed the disqualification, noting that no evidentiary hearing is necessary on a motion to
disqualify. 6 0 In the other case, the court vacated a final judgment
that was rendered after the court had sua sponte disqualified counsel for
the plaintiff.' 6 ' The court of appeals noted that the trial court had not
applied the correct standards to the case, particularly whether the
lawyer had previously represented the opposing party in a "substantially
related" matter, whether that party had unduly delayed in raising the
issue, and whether the lawyer should be disqualified because he was a
necessary witness.1 62
IV.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Cases in Which Claims of Ineffective Assistance Ultimately
Prevailed
1. Georgia Supreme Court. In McLaughlin v. Payne,'6 5 the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a finding that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance while appealing the client's conviction for
aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and cruelty to children.' 6 4 The District Attorney for the Douglas Judicial Circuit, David
McDade, was found to have a conflict of interest in the case because he
acquired a personal stake in the defendant's conviction."' McDade's

157.
158.

Id. at 226, 227, 230, 767 S.E.2d at 769, 771.
Shuttleworth v. Rankin-Shuttleworth of Georgia, LLC, 328 Ga. App. 593, 593,596,

597, 759 S.E.2d 873, 875, 877 (2014).
159. Id. at 596, 759 S.E.2d at 877.
160. Id. at 596-97, 597, 759 S.E.2d at 877.
161. Befekadu v. Addis Int'l Money Transfer, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 103, 103, 772 S.E.2d
785, 786 (2015).
162. Id. at 105-06, 106, 107-08, 772 S.E.2d at 787-88, 788, 789.

163. 295 Ga. 609, 761 S.E.2d 289 (2014).
164. Id. at 609, 614-15, 761 S.E.2d at 291, 294-95.
165. Id. at 614, 761 S.E.2d at 294.
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daughter was a classmate of the victim."'
McDade testified that he
had an emotional conversation with his daughter that was "very
troubling," and that he paid particular attention to the situation because
he was "concerned that she's concerned.""' McDade's disqualification
was imputed to the entire office, but one of McDade's assistants tried
the case. The special statutory procedures for appointing a special
prosecutor were not followed."' The defendant's trial counsel neglected
to raise this issue on appeal, and the supreme court held that the failure
to do so was ineffective assistance and that the result of the defendant's
appeal would have been different if this issue had been raised."
In Alexander v. State,70 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer
failed to advise him that he would not be eligible for parole from his
lengthy sentences because the defendant was a recidivist."' The court
overruled Williams v. Duffy 72 and held that a lawyer performs
deficiently in connection with a guilty plea if the lawyer fails to advise
the client of certain collateral consequences of the plea.' 73 The factors
for the courts to consider are "(1) whether the collateral consequence is
intimately related to the criminal process and is 'nearly an automatic
result' flowing from the conviction; (2) whether the consequence is a
'drastic measure' or a penalty with harsh ramifications for the client;
and (3) whether the law imposing the consequence is 'succinct, clear and
explicit."'"
The question in Humphrey v. Walker.'. was whether defense lawyers
rendered ineffective assistance in a murder case when their client
refused to be evaluated to determine whether he was competent to stand

166. Id. at 609, 761 S.E.2d at 291.
167. Id. at 614, 761 S.E.2d at 294.
168. Id. at 613, 614, 761 S.E.2d at 294; see also O.C.G.A. § 15-18-5(a) (2012).
169. McLaughlin, 295 Ga. at 614-15, 761 S.E.2d at 294-95. The court also discussed
whether appellant counsel was deficient for failing to seek a reversal because McDade had
been a witness at trial. Id. at 611-12, 761 S.E.2d at 293. The court noted that McDade's
status as a witness disqualified him, but not the other lawyers in the office, from acting
as trial counsel, under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. Id. at 611, 761 S.E.2d at
293. It was McDade's personal interest conflict, presumably under Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7, that was imputed, and appellant counsel's failure to raise that
issue was the ineffective assistance. Id. at 611-12, 761 S.E.2d at 293.
170. 297 Ga. 59, 772 S.E.2d 655 (2015).
171. Id. at 65, 772 S.E.2d at 660.
172. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999).
173. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 60, 64-65, 772 S.E.2d at 657, 659-60.
174. Id. at 64-65, 772 S.E.2d at 660 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-69
(2010) and Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (2010)).
175. 294 Ga. 855, 757 S.E.2d 68 (2014).
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trial, and counsel abandoned further efforts to make that determination.1 6 In a lengthy opinion that discusses, in great detail, the
evidence of bizarre behavior by the defendant, the supreme court
affirmed the grant of a habeas corpus petition.177 The court held that
no reasonable lawyer would have given up on the competency issue just
because the client would not cooperate; further, it determined that the
record supported a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
been found not competent to stand trial. 78
In Humphrey v. Williams,' the supreme court affirmed a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel in a child molestation case. 1o The
defendant was convicted after the jury heard evidence about alleged
similar acts of molestation that occurred years before. In fact, there
were court records readily available to defense counsel that were
evidence that no such act had occurred.'' In a case in which the
direct evidence was contradictory, the court held that trial counsel's
failure to secure and use the records was unreasonable and that there
was a reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been
different.' 2
In Sullivan v. Kemp,' 8 ' the supreme court reversed the habeas
court's finding that appellate counsel had not rendered ineffective
assistance.'8 The defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault
in a "shaken baby syndrome" case, but the trial court's jury charge failed
to inform the jury that it had to find criminal intent, rather than
criminal negligence, in order to convict.'85 To compound the problem,
the prosecutor told the jury in his closing argument that it was a
criminal negligence case and the defendant "shook that baby in a
criminally negligent manner."' Trial counsel objected to the charge,
but appellate counsel did not raise the argument on appeal because, he
admitted, he was not familiar with the relevant law.'"' The supreme
court granted the petition for habeas corpus.'
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Id. at 874, 757 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. at 865, 876, 757 S.E.2d at 77, 84.
Id. at 874-76, 757 S.E.2d at 83-84.
295 Ga. 536, 761 S.E.2d 297 (2014).
Id. at 537, 761 S.E.2d at 300.
Id. at 536, 761 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 558, 761 S.E.2d at 313-14.
293 Ga. 770, 749 S.E.2d 721 (2013).
Id. at 770, 749 S.E.2d at 722.
Id. at 770, 771, 749 S.E.2d at 722, 723.
Id. at 773, 749 S.E.2d at 724 (alterations in original).
Id. at 774, 749 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 776, 749 S.E.2d at 726.
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2. Georgia Court of Appeals. In State v. Walker,'"' the court of
appeals ordered a new trial for a defendant who had been convicted of
aggravated assault, false imprisonment, criminal trespass, and battery
9
on the basis of the testimony of the victim, an ex-girlfriend."'
Trial
counsel had been aware of two witnesses who could have testified that
the victim's version of events was untrue and that the victim had a
reputation for being untruthful."' One of the witnesses would have
testified that he saw the victim "grabbing her own throat and making
marks on herself' after the defendant allegedly assaulted her. 92 Yet
trial counsel did not attempt to interview one witness until just before
trial and never attempted to contact the other witness.' 98 In a case in
which the prosecution's evidence was "thin," such a failure to investigate,
interview, and present the two witnesses was ineffective assistance of
counsel.19 4

The defendant in Ottley v. State'95 was convicted of numerous crimes
in connection with multiple episodes of molestation and rape of his
stepdaughter. The prosecution's case consisted, in part, of the victim's
testimony and testimony about the victim's changes in behavior.' 6
The victim's testimony, however, was "at times inconsistent and selfcontradictory," and she first made the allegations only after her mother
and stepfather were in a contested divorce."' The evidence suggested
other plausible reasons for her changes in behavior."'
The court of
appeals noted that "medical evidence was crucial in establishing that
sexual abuse had occurred."' 9 9
The medical evidence came from the State's two expert witnesses,

neither of whom defense counsel interviewed before trial. One was both
a nurse practitioner and a sexual assault nurse examiner. 20 0 Defense
counsel did not cross-examine this witness because he was "totally
unprepared" to do so. 20 1 He expressed surprise that she was allowed
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327 Ga. App. 304, 758 S.E.2d 836 (2014).
Id. at 304, 305, 758 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 306, 758 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
Id. at 306-07, 758 S.E.2d at 838.
Id. at 308, 758 S.E.2d at 839.
325 Ga. App. 15, 752 S.E.2d 92 (2013).
Id. at 15-16, 752 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 23, 752 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 23, 752 S.E.2d at 98-99.
Id. at 23, 752 S.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 16, 18, 752 S.E.2d at 94, 95.
Id. at 19, 752 S.E.2d at 96.
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to testify at all, especially about matters that were allegedly not in her
report. 202 The court of appeals pointed out, however, that counsel
should have known that, under established Georgia law, the nurse
practitioner would qualify as an expert. The court also noted that trial
counsel had overlooked important matters in her report. 20 3 Trial
counsel only asked the other expert two questions, but that expert gave
a post-trial affidavit stating that he would have contradicted part of the
nurse practitioner's testimony if he had been asked the right questions.
Another experienced physician gave opinions in a post-trial affidavit that
contradicted the nurse practitioner's opinions in significant ways. 0
The court of appeals concluded that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he "failed to present evidence to counter what he should
have known would be important medical evidence in the case." 2 05
In Byrd v. State,20 6 the defendant was convicted of numerous crimes,
including one of aggravated assault for striking a victim with a
handgun.2 07 In order to justify a conviction for aggravated assault, the
prosecution had to prove that the handgun was a deadly weapon, but the
court instructed the jury that "a firearm, when used as such, is a deadly
weapon as a matter of law."20 8 This instruction would only have been
correct if the gun was alleged to have been used as a gun is ordinarily
used-to point at or shoot at someone-rather than as a club. 2 09 Trial
counsel did not object to this erroneous instruction, and the jury
convicted Byrd in the absence of sufficient proof that the gun was
actually used as a deadly weapon. 21 0 The court of appeals, therefore,
found that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as to that count
and reversed that part of the conviction.21
The defendant in Dodd v. State2 12 was convicted of possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The State presented
evidence that Dodd had been involved in two similar transactions, but
the trial court erroneously charged the jury that this evidence could be
considered, not just for the state of mind of the defendant, but also to
prove the particular crime with which the defendant had been charged.

202. Id.
203. Id. at 21-22, 752 S.E.2d at 97-98.
204. Id. at 20, 22, 752 S.E.2d at 96-97, 98.
205. Id. at 23, 752 S.E.2d at 99.
206. 325 Ga. App. 24, 752 S.E.2d 84 (2013).
207. Id. at 24, 752 S.E.2d at 86.
208. Id. at 27, 752 S.E.2d at 88.
209. Id. at 27-28, 752 S.E.2d at 88.
210. Id. at 29, 752 S.E.2d at 89.
211. Id.
212. 324 Ga. App. 827, 752 S.E.2d 29 (2013).
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Defense counsel did not object to this erroneous instruction because he
did not see anything wrong with it.2 1 3 The court of appeals noted that
the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming and reversed
the conviction because of counsel's ineffective assistance.214
In Cheeks v. State,215 the defendant was convicted of rape and false
imprisonment, almost exclusively due to the victim's testimony.216 The
jury convicted the defendant after the prosecutor made "egregious and
pervasive" references to the defendant's silence.2 17 These references
to silence occurred during the opening statement, the questioning of at
least one witness, and the closing argument, when the prosecutor argued
that the defendant did not speak to the police because the defendant was
guilty. All of these references to the defendant's silence were clearly
impermissible, yet defense counsel did not object.2 18 Her failure to
object, she testified, arose not from a strategic decision, but rather
because it was her first trial as lead counsel and she was "extremely
nervous."219 The trial court denied the motion for a new trial because,
it concluded, there was not a reasonable probability that the defense
counsel's failure to object had any effect on the outcome. 220 The court
of appeals disagreed and ordered a new trial based upon defense
counsel's ineffectiveness.221
Roger Darst was convicted of four counts of aggravated child
molestation of foster children who were under his care. The victims
were sisters-ages twenty-two months and four years, respectively-who
came to live with Darst in September 2002. They lived with Darst for
over two years and then learned in September 2004 that they would be
moving to Pennsylvania to live with their paternal grandparents. Soon
thereafter, the girls made claims that Darst had molested them. The
children were interviewed repeatedly by therapists and investigators,
and the State charged Darst because of the children's allegations.22 2
The court of appeals concluded that Darst's trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance in four respects and that the cumulative effect of

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
867-68,

Id. at 827, 829, 829-30, 831, 835, 752 S.E.2d at 31, 32, 33, 35.
Id. at 835, 752 S.E.2d at 35, 36.
325 Ga. App. 367, 750 S.E.2d 753 (2013).
Id. at 367, 369, 750 S.E.2d at 754, 755.
Id. at 369, 750 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 368, 750 S.E.2d at 754-55.
Id. at 368, 750 S.E.2d at 754.
Id. at 368-69, 750 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 370, 750 S.E.2d at 755-56.
Darst v. State, 323 Ga. App. 614, 614, 614-15, 615, 615-16, 746 S.E.2d 865, 867,
868, 868-69, 869 (2013).
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First, the court

reasoned, counsel did not seek to subpoena the children's records from
school therapists or the Department of Family and Children's Services. 22 4 The records would have shown that the children had made
allegations that their biological father had touched them inappropriately
before they went to foster care, that they did well while they were living
with Darst, and that their claims against Darst came only after they had
been told they were moving to Pennsylvania. 22 5 Trial counsel gave no
strategic reason for not seeking the records. 226 He decided to "let it go"
once he was told the records were unavailable.2 27
Second, the court determined that trial counsel did not retain an
expert witness to testify that the children's behavior was inconsistent
with having been molested by Darst. 228 They did well in school while
they lived with him and were observed acting affectionately rather than
fearfully toward him. 22 9 At the hearing on the motion for a new trial,
an expert testified that children who have been abused tend to fear and
avoid the perpetrator and tend to have difficulties in school.23 1 Trial
counsel testified that it never occurred to him to retain an expert
witness to testify about these matters.231
Third, the court determined that trial counsel did not retain an expert
to critique the interrogations of the victims. 23 2 At the hearing on the
motion for a new trial, two experts testified that the children's statements were unreliable because they had been subjected to untrained,
suggestive, and biased questioning.2 3 ' Again, trial counsel testified
23 4
that he never considered hiring an expert to give such testimony.
Finally, the court reasoned that trial counsel did not object to
damaging hearsay evidence.23 5 One possible defense theory was that
the children had been molested by their father and an uncle rather than
Darst.2 36 Yet defense counsel did not object to hearsay testimony that

223. Id. at 614, 746 S.E.2d at 867-68.
224. Id. at 619, 746 S.E.2d at 871.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 619-20, 746 S.E.2d at 871.
228. Id. at 623, 746 S.E.2d at 873-74.
229. Id. at 621, 746 S.E.2d at 872-73.
230. Id. at 622, 746 S.E.2d at 873.
231. Id. at 623, 746 S.E.2d at 874.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 625-26, 746 S.E.2d at 875.
234. Id. at 626, 746 S.E.2d at 875.
235. Id. at 627, 746 S.E.2d at 876.
236. Id. at 627-28, 746 S.E.2d at 876-77.
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the father and uncle had completed a psycho-sexual evaluation with no
"red flags."2 37 Defense counsel also did not object when a witness
testified that Darst had been requested to undergo such an evaluation
but that the witness was not sure whether he had done so. 2 38 Counsel
testified that his failure to object to this evidence was not for a strategic
reason. 239 Based upon the collective effect of these deficiencies, the
court of appeals concluded that there was a reasonable probability that
the outcome would have been different if counsel had not been ineffective.24 0 The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new
'

trial. 24

In Honester v. State,242 the court of appeals held that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting a plea in bar to the
defendant's retrial because the judge had improperly entered a sua
sponte order of a mistrial in the midst of jury deliberations in the first
trial.243 Counsel gave no explanation for not filing the plea except that
it never "crossed [his] mind."2 " The court held that the defendant
showed harm from the error because there was a reasonable probability
that the plea would have prevented the retrial.24 5
Raynard Lexie was sentenced to a life term, to serve twenty-five years,
after he rejected a plea bargain (that was offered several times) in which
he would have agreed to serve twelve years with credit for time
served. 2 46 Lexie's attorney talked him out of his initial decision to
accept the offer, saying that Lexie had "the best case he had ever seen,"
"no reasonable jury would convict him," and that if he lost the case,
counsel "would turn in his bar card."247 The trial court granted Lexie's
motion for a new trial.24 8 It found that Lexie received ineffective
assistance in connection with the plea offer because counsel "all but
guaranteed an outcome for his client that he knew, or should have
known, he could not promise." 24 9 The court of appeals affirmed the
result and noted that Lexie had made it clear that he wanted to accept

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id. at 628, 746 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 629, 746 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 630, 746 S.E.2d at 878.
Id.
329 Ga. App. 406, 765 S.E.2d 376 (2014).
Id. at 406, 407, 765 S.E.2d at 377-78, 378.
Id. at 408, 765 S.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 413, 765 S.E.2d at 382.
State v. Lexie, 331 Ga. App. 400, 400, 401, 771 S.E.2d 97, 98, 99 (2015).
Id. at 401, 771 S.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 404, 771 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 402-03, 771 S.E.2d at 100.
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the plea and that there was no indication that the State would not have
abided by the agreement or that the court would not have approved
it.

25 0

The defendant in Sorrells v. State25 1 was convicted of selling cocaine
and was sentenced as a recidivist. His defense was that he had been
misidentified. The seller used the alias "Black," and Sorrells contended
that he had only used the alias "Boot.""' In an apparent effort to
bolster that defense, his trial counsel introduced booking records that
showed Sorrells had been arrested for numerous crimes, including
possession and sale of cocaine, "aggravated stalking, aggravated assault,
felony obstruction of an officer, multiple battery charges, false imprisonment, criminal damage to property, criminal trespass, interference with
a 911 call, and multiple parole violations."253 Counsel's rationale for
parading his client's rich criminal history before the jury was that the
records showed only "Boot" as an alias and not "Black."2" The Georgia
Court of Appeals held that this was deficient performance and noted that
calling a decision a "tactic" or a "strategy" does not immunize the
decision if no reasonable attorney would have made the same choice. 255
The court also found that counsel rendered deficient performance by
failing to seek the identity of the confidential informant who was one of
only three witnesses to the drug sale.2 56 Counsel stated that he
decided not to seek that information because the informant's testimony
would have harmed his client, but the court noted that counsel made
this decision without knowing what the informant's testimony would
be.257 The court remanded the case for a hearing on the issue of
prejudice to the defendant from these instances of deficient performance
by trial counsel.25 8
In Hutchins v. State,259 evidence of a defendant's prior bad conduct
also was admitted. The defendant was convicted of permitting her
young child to be present in a home in which methamphetamine was
being manufactured by the defendant's mother. 260 The defendant's

250. Id. at 403-04, 771 S.E.2d at 101.
251. 326 Ga. App. 888, 755 S.E.2d 586 (2014).
252. Id. at 890, 755 S.E.2d at 590.
253. Id. at 894-95, 755 S.E.2d at 592-93.
254. Id. at 894, 755 S.E.2d at 592.
255. Id. at 895-96, 755 S.E.2d at 593.
256. Id. at 896, 897-98, 755 S.E.2d at 594.
257. Id. at 896, 755 S.E.2d at 594.
258. Id. at 896, 755 S.E.2d at 593.
259. 326 Ga. App. 250, 756 S.E.2d 347 (2014).
260. Id. at 254, 255, 756 S.E.2d at 351, 352. The defendant was also convicted of
knowingly possessing certain items with the intent to convey them to others for use in the
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testimony was that she was unaware that her mother had resumed
making the drug. During trial, a police investigator testified that the
defendant had participated in an unrelated "pill ring" conspiracy, which
obtained narcotics by fraud and resold them. Trial counsel did not object
to this inadmissible character evidence because "she did not think the
evidence was harmful." 26 1 Because defense counsel could not offer any
strategic reason for failing to object, and because the court of appeals
concluded that there was a reasonable probability in this circumstantial
evidence case that the result would have been different if the lawyer had
objected, the court reversed and ordered a new trial on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 62
The defendant in Mowoe v. State2 63 was convicted of rape. Mowoe
contended that he had consensual sex with the alleged victim and that
some of the alleged victim's injuries occurred before the sexual encounter. Mowoe's girlfriend could have given testimony that would have
supported those contentions, but neither the prosecution nor the defense
called the girlfriend to testify. The prosecution, however, subpoenaed
the girlfriend to attend court on the day of closing arguments and,
during argument, had her stand up and make her presence known to the
jury. Apparently, the point of that exercise was to demonstrate to the
jury that the girlfriend was available and could have been called to
testify and, from those facts, to ask the jury to infer that her testimony
would not have supported the defendant.264 The court of appeals held
that this demonstration was improper because it was not based upon
evidence in the case." The defendant's trial counsel did not object
because she was "surprised" and "taken off guard."266 The court of
appeals found that trial counsel's failure to object was deficient
performance and that, because the evidence was not overwhelming, there
was a reasonable possibility that the result of the trial would have been
different if she had objected. 26 7 The court of appeals ordered a new
trial.268

manufacture of methamphetamine. The court of appeals reversed this conviction for
insufficiency of evidence. Id. at 250 & n.1, 756 S.E.2d at 348 & n.1.
261. Id. at 250, 253, 256-57, 257, 756 S.E.2d at 348, 350, 352-53, 353.
262. Id. at 258, 756 S.E.2d at 353-54.
263. 328 Ga. App. 536, 759 S.E.2d 663 (2014).
264. Id. at 537, 538, 539, 540, 759 S.E.2d at 666, 667.
265. Id. at 540, 759 S.E.2d at 667.
266. Id. at 539, 759 S.E.2d at 666.
267. Id. at 541, 759 S.E.2d at 667-68.
268. Id. at 541, 759 S.E.2d at 668.
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Findings of Ineffective Assistance Reversed

1. Georgia Supreme Court. In one case, the supreme court
reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial that resulted from the
defense lawyer's decision in a murder case to seek a jury charge on the
legal concept of "mutual combat."26 9 The charge undermined one
theory of the defense that the killing was justified. Because the
instruction was useful, however, in the attempt to secure a manslaughter verdict rather than murder, the supreme court held that it was a
matter of trial strategy and thus could not be ineffective assistance.27 o
In Brown v. Parody,2 7 ' a lawyer was allegedly ineffective for not
pursuing a claim that the client was incompetent to stand trial.2 7 2
Over a dissent from Justices Benham and Hunstein, the supreme court
reversed the habeas court.2 7 3 The court held that the lawyer conducted
a reasonable investigation of the issue by securing three evaluations of
the client (although the evaluations were not consistent), and the record
did not show a reasonable probability that the client would have been
found not competent to stand trial if the lawyer had pressed the
issue.274
In Humphrey v. Nance,275 the supreme court reversed the habeas
court and reinstated the death penalty for a defendant who was
convicted of murder.276 The habeas court found that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at a resentencing hearing because counsel had not
adequately presented evidence of the defendant's low mental functioning,
organic brain damage, or the effects of his exposure to tear gas in the
minutes before the murder.27 7 However, the supreme court concluded
that counsel made a sufficient presentation as to the first issue and
2 78
made reasonable tactical decisions as to the other two.
Johnnie Worsley was convicted of the murder of his wife and the
murder and rape of his stepdaughter and was sentenced to death.27 9

269. State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876, 876, 770 S.E.2d 1, 1 (2015), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Jul. 8, 2015) (No. 15-5172).
270. Id. at 881, 770 S.E.2d at 10-12.
271. 294 Ga. 240, 751 S.E.2d 793 (2013).
272. Id. at 240, 751 S.E.2d at 795.
273. Id. at 244, 751 S.E.2d at 797.
274. Id. at 240, 241, 242, 751 S.E.2d at 794, 795, 796.
275. 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706 (2013).
276. Id. at 190, 744 S.E.2d at 709.
277. Id. at 191, 744 S.E.2d at 710.
278. Id. at 209, 211, 218, 221, 744 S.E.2d at 722, 723, 727, 729.
279. State v. Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 315-16, 745 S.E.2d 617, 619 (2013).
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The trial court ordered a new sentencing hearing because of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but the supreme court reversed and reinstated the
death penalty.280 The court first noted that the failure to call the
defendant's family members resulted not from a failure to investigate
what they would say but rather from a reasonable tactical choice not to
present witnesses who would contradict other mitigation evidence, would
be subject to harmful cross-examination, would not make good witnesses,
and would, at best, add little to the mitigation evidence otherwise being
presented.28 1 The court also found that counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object to victim-impact testimony that, although improper in
that it asked the jury to vote for the death penalty, was not so prejudicial that an objection would have likely changed the result.2 8 2
In O'Donnell v. Smith,"' the supreme court also reversed a finding
The habeas court had granted relief
of ineffective assistance.2 84
because trial and appellate counsel did not challenge the State's proof of
venue, the availability of an unredacted indictment injury deliberations,
or the participation of an alternate juror.285 The court disposed of the
first two issues briefly, finding that the State had adequately proven
venue and that the unredacted indictment could not have caused the
defendant any harm.28" As to the third issue, the alternate juror gave
an affidavit that stated that he had been permitted to go home when the
jury began deliberating and that he had researched the case; the
The court held that
affidavit also described the jury's deliberations.2
the affidavit was used improperly to impeach the jury's verdict,
particularly because it was silent regarding whether the alternate had
shared the fruits of his out-of-court research with the other jurors.2 88
2. Georgia Court of Appeals. In State v. Shelton,2 89 the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial because of
ineffective assistance. 2 0 The appellate court held that trial counsel
made a strategic decision not to file a motion to suppress (which would
have been denied in any event), conducted a reasonable investigation of

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 316, 745 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 626-27.
Id. at 328, 745 S.E.2d at 628.
294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (2013).
Id. at 307, 751 S.E.2d at 326.
Id.
Id. at 311-12, 312-13, 751 S.E.2d at 328-29, 329.
Id. at 310, 751 S.E.2d at 327.
Id. at 309, 310, 751 S.E.2d at 327, 327-28.
329 Ga. App. 582, 765 S.E.2d 732 (2014).
Id. at 588, 765 S.E.2d at 738.
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the case, and properly did not object to the admission of physical
evidence that would have been admitted even if there had been an
objection.291
V.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

The Georgia appellate courts decided several noteworthy cases
regarding judicial conduct. Three involved the reversal of criminal
convictions because of the judges' improper comments during trial. One
such comment concerned the voluntariness of a statement to the
police,292 while another was about the propriety of a police officer using
deception in an interrogation.2 9 3 In a third case, the judge improperly
asked one witness whether the witness was telling the truth and
questioned another witness and, in so doing, made a statement that
tended to discount other testimony by that witness.2 94
In two cases, the supreme court was critical of the trial judges' conduct
but held that the complaining parties had waived any right to redress.
In one, a judge had an ex parte conversation with a former counsel for
one criminal defendant about some audio recordings that the judge was
considering in camera. The other defendant complained on appeal but
had never sought to disqualify the trial judge.2 9 5 The court of appeals
had ordered a new trial, but the supreme court found that the issue had
been waived. Nevertheless, the supreme court made a point of writing
that "[o]ur opinion should not be understood to sanction the way in
which the trial judge dealt with the ex parte communication in this
case."296 In another case, the trial judge referred to counsel a number of
times by first names and called the defense lawyer "Young Lady," "Ms.
Young Lady," and "Miss Conflict" (the lawyer worked for the conflict
defender's office).297 The supreme court affirmed the conviction but
stated that "[wle do not condone the trial judge's use of first names and
potentially belittling monikers to refer to counsel, particularly in the
presence of the jury."298
The court of appeals reversed five criminal convictions because, at the
time of the trials, the trial judge was involved in a sexual relationship

291.
292.
293.
294.
(2014).
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 585, 587, 765 S.E.2d at 735-36, 737.
Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820, 821, 764 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2014).
Haymer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 874, 877-78, 747 S.E.2d 512, 515-16 (2013).
Williams v. State, 329 Ga. App. 706, 712-13, 713, 714-15, 766 S.E.2d 474, 480, 481
State v. Hargis, 294 Ga. 818, 819, 820-21, 756 S.E.2d 529, 532, 532-33, 533 (2014).
Id. at 823 n.11, 756 S.E.2d at 535 n.11.
Anderson v. State, 296 Ga. 524, 526, 769 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2015).
Id. at 526, 769 S.E.2d at 307.

LEGAL ETHICS

2015]

137

with a public defender who represented the defendants or co-defendants.2 9 9 The court held that the judge violated Canon 3(E)(1) Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct,"oo which provides that "Judges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning .. . a party's
30
lawyer."o

VI.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two noteworthy legal malpractice cases during the survey period. In Anderson v. Jones,3 0 2 the
plaintiff alleged that her lawyer committed malpractice and breached his
fiduciary duties in connection with a settlement of the client's personal
injury case. The client alleged that the lawyer reached a lump-sum
(aggregate) settlement of her claim and the claims of her family
members (including the plaintiff's father), arising from a traffic accident.
The plaintiff alleged that the aggregate settlement caused the lawyer to
have a conflict of interest because his four clients had competing claims
on the money.303 The court affirmed summary judgment and held that
the lawyer did not have a conflict of interest because there was no
evidence that the settlement was an aggregate settlement.3 0 4 The
lawyer's undisputed testimony was that he had negotiated four separate
settlements, for a total amount well under the insured's policy limits. 3 0"

The court went on to hold that the plaintiff had not shown any

damage because there was no evidence that her settlement was
unfair.3 0 ' The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the lawyer
breached his duty to her by not seeing that her medical expenses, for
which her father would be responsible, came out of the father's share of
The plaintiff presented no expert testimony to
the settlement. 307
support her claim that the lawyer's failure to do so breached the
3
" Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment on
standard of careo.
the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims "for the reasons explained"

299. State v. Wakefield, 324 Ga. App. 587, 587, 751 S.E.2d 199, 201 (2013).
300. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (2015).
301. Wakefield, 324 Ga. App. at 592-93, 751 S.E.2d at 204, 205 (first alteration in
original) (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3(E)(1)).
302. 323 Ga. App. 311, 745 S.E.2d 787 (2013).
303. Id. at 311-12, 312, 314, 315, 745 S.E.2d at 789, 789-90, 791, 792.
304. Id. at 316, 318, 745 S.E.2d at 792, 794.
305. Id. at 316, 745 S.E.2d at 792.
306. Id. at 316-17, 745 S.E.2d at 792-93.
307. Id. at 317, 745 S.E.2d at 793.
308. Id. at 318, 745 S.E.2d at 793.
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3
in connection with the legal malpractice claimo.
"
The court did not
discuss the possibility that, if the plaintiff had been able to show that
the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty by representing her, despite a
conflict of interest, she might have been entitled to a remedy other than
damages, namely forfeiture or disgorgement of some or all of the
attorney fees. 1 o
In Kahn v. Britt,an the court of appeals found occasion to remind
lawyers of two important issues regarding who may sue a lawyer for
malpractice. 3 12 One of the lawyer-defendants represented a trust. The
plaintiff was a beneficiary of the trust and had transferred personal
assets to the trust.1 3 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the lawyer, but the appellate court held that there was a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the relationship between the lawyer and the
beneficiary, for two reasons.3 1'
First, there was evidence that the
lawyer gave advice to the beneficiary that the asset transfer was for the
beneficiary's interest.3 15 The court concluded that there was, therefore,
a material issue of fact whether there was an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the beneficiary because under Georgia law,
such a relationship can arise by implication when the would-be client
seeks and receives the lawyer's advice and assistance.316 Second, the
court noted that an attorney can be liable "to third parties who rely upon
the professional's advice in situations where the professional was
manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and
intended that it be so used."' The court found that the plaintiff was
a foreseeable person who would rely upon the lawyer's advice.318

309. Id. at 318, 745 S.E.2d at 794.
310. Id. at 321, 745 S.E.2d at 795; see Helms & Greene, LLC v. Willis, 333 Ga. App.
396, 399-400, 773 S.E.2d 491, 494 (2015). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author is
currently serving as an expert witness in a case that involves, among other issues, claims
that attorneys violated their fiduciary duties in connection with an alleged aggregate
settlement. The plaintiffs in that case are seeking, among other remedies, fee disgorgement.
311. 330 Ga. App. 377, 765 S.E.2d 446 (2014).
312. See id. at 387, 765 S.E.2d at 457.
313. Id. at 379, 765 S.E.2d at 452.
314. Id. at 387, 765 S.E.2d at 457.
315. Id. at 387-88, 765 S.E.2d at 457.
316. Id. at 387, 388, 765 S.E.2d at 457, 457-58.
317. Id. at 388,765 S.E.2d at 457-58 (quoting Rogers v. Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd
& Cadenhead, 203 Ga. App. 412, 416, 417 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1992)).
318. Id. at 388, 765 S.E.2d at 458.
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FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS

The Georgia Supreme Court approved two significant opinions of the
State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board during the survey
period. The court approved Formal Advisory Opinion 13-1,3'1 which
concerns so-called "witness only" real estate closings. 320 The opinion
reaches three conclusions. First, a Georgia lawyer may not conduct a
real estate closing in which the lawyer is acting merely as a witness and
not as an attorney. 32 1 Second, a Georgia lawyer may use documents
prepared by others for a closing, but the lawyer must review them,
correct them as necessary, and otherwise act with competence.32 2
Third, a Georgia lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real
estate closing must deposit them into the lawyer's trust account or the
trust account of another lawyer.323
The court also approved Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 (FAO 101),324 which concludes that under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct
1.10325 lawyers in the same circuit public defender's office are members
of the same "firm." 32 6 Therefore, if one lawyer has a conflict in representing a client then that conflict is automatically imputed to the other
lawyers in the office. 3 27 The court made it clear that the opinion does
not create an automatic rule disqualifying members of the same office
from representing co-defendants. 328 If the circumstances are such that
any of the lawyers could represent both clients without a conflict, then
there is no conflict to impute. 3 29 The court also made it clear that it

was only interpreting Rule 1.10, and it left open the possibility of
amendments to the rule that would safeguard defendants but also
provide circuit public defenders more flexibility.330
Pryor v. State33' is an interesting application of FAO 10-1. In that
case, two attorneys from the same circuit public defender's office
represented co-defendants, one of whom struck a deal and testified

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

In re Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-1, 295 Ga. 749, 763 S.E.2d 875 (2014).
Id. at 749, 763 S.E.2d at 875.
Id. at 750, 763 S.E.2d at 875.
Id. at 750, 763 S.E.2d at 875-76.
Id. at 750, 763 S.E.2d at 876.
In re Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 744 S.E.2d 798 (2013).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2015).
In re Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1, 293 Ga. at 398, 744 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 399-400, 744 S.E.2d at 799-800.
Id. at 400, 744 S.E.2d at 800.
Id.
Id. at 400, 744 S.E.2d at 801.
333 Ga. App. 408, 776 S.E.2d 474 (2015).
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against the other.332 There could be no clearer application of FAO 101. One attorney could not have represented both defendants. Under
FAO 10-1, the conflicts of all public defenders in a particular circuit are
imputed to all lawyers in the office; therefore, there can be no question
that Pryor's lawyer had a conflict of interest in representing him.
Apparently, the office recognized the conflict and under took the
representation anyway."' Nevertheless, the court of appeals looked
beyond the conflict to see if it adversely affected the representation of
Pryor and found that it had not.334 His claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel, therefore, was denied."'
VIII.

CHANGES TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court approved two
noteworthy changes to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. First,
the court approved the addition of new Rule 6.5,33 which is intended
to facilitate the rendition of short-term legal services by lawyers who
help clients through nonprofit organizations.
Examples of such
services include "legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se

'

counseling programs" in which such a limited scope of representation is
reasonable." Lawyers would be hesitant to provide such assistance
if the usual rules on conflicts of interest and imputation of conflicts
applied. New Rule 6.5 provides that Rule 1.73" (concurrent conflicts
of interest) and Rule 1.9340 (former client conflicts of interest) apply in
these circumstances only if the lawyer knows about the conflict, and it
states further, the lawyer has an imputed conflict under Rule 1.10 only
if the lawyer knows about it.3 41 The new rule also provides that the
short-term client will be considered a former client of the lawyer for
purposes of Rule 1.9 but that this conflict will not be imputed to other
members of the lawyer's firm.34

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 410, 776 S.E.2d at 476-77.
Id. at 413-14, 776 S.E.2d at 478-79.
Id. at 413, 414, 776 S.E.2d at 478, 479.
Id. at 414, 776 S.E.2d at 479.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2015).
See id.
Id. at cmt. 1.

339.
340.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2015).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2015).

341.
342.

Id. at R. 6.5(a)(1), (2).
Id. at R. 6.5(c).
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Second, the supreme court approved amendments to Rule 7.214 that
require lawyers who advertise to make a series of prominent disclosures.'" These required disclosures include, for all advertisements,
the identity and physical location of the attorney. 4 1 Other disclosures
must be made if they are applicable.34 6 If the lawyer refers a majority
of callers to other attorneys, that must be disclosed.4
Lawyers must
disclose any use in the advertisement of a "non-attorney spokesperson,
portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, [or] of a client by a non-client."3 "
Lawyers who advertise fixed fees must have available a
written statement that describes the scope of the services covered by
such a fee.3 4 ' Finally, any advertisement that is in the form of a legal
document must include a prominent disclosure that it is an advertisement.5 o
IX.

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

The court of appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of the client in a case
involving a claim that a law firm breached its fiduciary duties to its
client. 5 The court noted the established principles in Georgia stating
that "[an attorney-client relationship imposes upon the attorney a
fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, which includes the
responsibility not to pursue interests or take acts adverse to the client's
interest."3 5 2 The court affirmed on the basis of evidence that the firm
overbilled the client by billing for work that was not necessary and
taking excessive time to do other work." There was also evidence
from a former lawyer in the firm that "the firm had instructed him to
'think more creatively' about his cases to meet billable hour requirements." 54

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
concern
Several
351.
(2015).
352.
353.
354.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2015).
Id. at R. 7.2(c).
Id. at R. 7.2(c)(1).
See id. at R. 7.2(c)(2)-(5).
Id. at R. 7.2(c)(2).
Id. at R. 7.2(c)(3).
Id. at R. 7.2(c)(4).
Id. at R. 7.2(c)(5). Lawyers to whom these provisions of Rule 7.2 might be of
should monitor any further amendments to this rule by the supreme court.
changes are under consideration at the time of the publication of this article.
Cordell & Cordell, P.C. v. Gao, 331 Ga. App. 522, 522, 771 S.E.2d 196, 197-98
Id. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200.
Id. at 526-27, 771 S.E.2d at 200-01.
Id. at 527, 771 S.E.2d at 201.
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The court of appeals decided one noteworthy case regarding liens for
attorney fees. 35 5 A law firm procured a client and conducted a pre-suit
investigation of the claim. The client fired the firm and hired another
lawyer who, with other associated counsel, filed the case and obtained
a substantial recovery. The original firm filed a lien and obtained a
judgment in the trial court that it was entitled, under the doctrine of
quantum meruit, to twenty-five percent of the recovery for having
originated the case and five percent of the recovery for its pre-filing
3
investigation".
The court of appeals held that the firm could recover
for the work performed for the client, even though the firm never filed
the case.35
It also held that "[o]rigination or procurement of a case
-in other words, rainmaking-is not a service by an attorney that
confers value upon a client or that is rendered to or for the benefit of the
client.""' The court of appeals reversed the award of twenty-five
percent of the proceeds for having originated the case.'
In Ford Motor Co. v. Young,360 the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to revoke the pro hac vice admission of
two Alabama attorneys who represented Ford in a Georgia product
liability and wrongful death case.3 6 ' The trial court believed that the
lawyers had misled the court about the availability of insurance to cover
any judgment that the plaintiffs might recover.3 6 2 The court of appeals
decided two matters of first impression in Georgia and held that the
attorneys had standing to appeal the order, even though the underlying
case had settled, and that the matter was not moot, because of the
potential damage to the attorneys' reputations."' The court also held
that the trial court properly used the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct in analyzing the propriety of the lawyers' conduct, but also
decided, in another matter of first impression, that the lawyers were
entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations before
the court revoked their pro hac vice admission. 6

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
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364.

Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 324, 772 S.E.2d 416, 418.
Id. at 325, 326, 327, 327-28, 772 S.E.2d at 419, 420.
Id. at 332, 772 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 334, 772 S.E.2d at 424.
Id.
322 Ga. App. 348, 745 S.E.2d 299 (2013).
Id. at 348, 745 S.E.2d at 300.
Id. at 350-51, 745 S.E.2d at 301-02.
Id. at 352, 352-53, 745 S.E.2d at 302, 302-03.
Id. at 354, 745 S.E.2d at 304, 305.
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In Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly,"" counsel for the plaintiffs testified
at trial.366 Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 generally forbids
an advocate to testify as a necessary witness at trial, but there are a few
exceptions.3 6 7 The defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent
opposing counsel from testifying, but the trial court denied the motion,
and the court of appeals affirmed. 6
Counsel's testimony related to
spoliation of evidence by the defendant and was therefore relevant to
plaintiffs' claims for attorney fees as a result of stubborn litigiousness.' The court of appeals reasoned that the testimony fell within
the exception of Rule 3.7(a)(2) for testimony about the nature and value
70
of legal services rendered in the case.o
The court of appeals also
noted that the motion in limine did not seek to disqualify the attorneywitness, but the court held that in any event, such disqualification was
not required. 7 ' The motion in limine was filed three weeks before
trial, and the attorney had been working on the case for three years. 3 72
The court relied upon Rule 3.7(a)(3), which does not require disqualification of an attorney who will testify if disqualification would work a
substantial hardship on the attorney's client.17 3
The Georgia Supreme Court denied William Norman Robbins' petition
for readmission to the bar.3 " Mr. Robbins had been disbarred in 2003
for paying a runner to refer clients to him. 7' The court noted that an
applicant for readmission must show by clear and convincing evidence
that he or she has been rehabilitated.3 7 6 The court concluded that Mr.
Robbins had not carried that burden, particularly because he gave
evasive responses about his disciplinary history and about his lack of
candor in the disbarment proceeding. 7
The court acknowledged that
Mr. Robbins had presented some evidence of positive actions since his
disbarment but found this evidence insufficient to establish rehabilitation in light of the other evidence. 7

365.
366.
367.
(2015).
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369.
370.
371.
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375.
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377.
378.

322 Ga. App. 699, 746 S.E.2d 173 (2013).
Id. at 701, 746 S.E.2d at 176.
Id. at 702, 746 S.E.2d at 176-77; see also GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7
Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 700, 701, 746 S.E.2d at 175, 176.
Id. at 702, 746 S.E.2d at 177.
Id.
Id. at 177, 746 S.E.2d at 702-03.
Id.
Id.; see also GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a)(3).
In re Robbins, 295 Ga. 64, 757 S.E.2d 54 (2014).
Id. at 64, 757 S.E.2d at 55.
Id. at 67, 757 S.E.2d at 56-57.
Id. at 67, 757 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 68, 757 S.E.2d at 57-58.
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In Moss v. City of Dunwoody,"" the Georgia Supreme Court rejected
a challenge to a city ordinance that imposed an occupational tax on
attorneys.so The court held that the ordinance was not an impermissible "regulatory fee" because, among other reasons, it had no provision
for criminal sanctions and did not purport to give the city the ability to
suspend a lawyer's right to practice. 381 The court described "wellestablished" case law and distinguished the tax from regulatory actions
that transgress on the court's exclusive power to license and regulate
lawyers.
In St. Simon's Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn,
P C.," the court decided several issues related to attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. Lawyers in a law firm came to
believe that a client would seek to hold the firm responsible for losses
that the client sustained in connection with matters for which the firm
had represented the client. The lawyers continued to represent the
client but also consulted with the law firm's in-house counsel about the
client's potential claim against the firm. When the client sued the firm,
the client sought to depose and obtain documents from the firm's inhouse counsel. The firm resisted on the basis of attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine.38" The court held that the usual
principles of attorney-client privilege apply to this situation, specifically
that:
[T]he attorney-client privilege applies to communications between a
law firm's attorneys and its in-house counsel regarding a client's
potential claims against the firm where (1) there is a genuine attorneyclient relationship between the firm's lawyers and in-house counsel; (2)
the communications in question were intended to advance the firm's
interests in limiting exposure to liability rather than the client's
interests in obtaining sound legal representation; (3) the communications were conducted and maintained in confidence, and (4) no
exception to the privilege applies."
Similarly, the court held that the work product doctrine would apply
to materials generated by in-house counsel in connection with the
defense of the firm from a client's claim. 8 6 The court noted the ethical

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

293 Ga. 858, 750 S.E.2d 326 (2013).
Id. at 858, 750 S.E.2d at 328.
Id. at 859-60, 750 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.
293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013).
Id. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
Id. at 430, 746 S.E.2d at 109.
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problem that a firm faces when a current client threatens action against
the firm:
The above discussion depends on the assumption that it is permissible
for an attorney from within a law firm to represent the firm against a
current firm client. We acknowledge that such an arrangement appears
inconsistent with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to the
extent the Rules prohibit conflicts of interest and impute individual
attorney conflicts to all attorneys within a law firm.

. .

. At the point

firm attorneys seek advice from in-house counsel regarding a perceived
or actual malpractice claim by a current firm client, these attorneys
have developed interests adverse to those of the firm's client; under
Rule 1.10, these adverse interests would be imputed to all attorneys
within the firm, including in-house counsel."'
The court held, however, that potential violations of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct were not relevant to the question of privilege."8
X.

CONCLUSION

The appellate decisions, formal advisory opinions, and rules described
in this Article all constitute parts of the law of lawyering for Georgia
attorneys. To ensure compliance with this growing and changing body
of law, Georgia lawyers must engage in continuing study of their
professional obligations. The purpose of this Article is to aid in that
important endeavor.

.

387. Id. at 424-25, 746 S.E.2d at 105 (citing Rule 1.7 (a) ("A lawyer shall not represent
or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests
. . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client . . . .") and Rule
1.10 ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so. .
388. Id. at 425, 746 S.E.2d at 105-06.
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